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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the real effects of corruption on a firm’s production function. Using an aug-
mented-Solow Growth model, with multifactor productivity as a function of corruption, a closed-
form solution is derived for real GDP per capita, economic growth and physical capital per capi-
ta, at steady-state. With the a priori assumption of a negative relationship between corruption and 
multifactor productivity, it is shown that corruption negates a society’s standard of living, eco-
nomic growth and investment level. OLS results of the closed-form solutions not only support this 
theoretical finding for a full cross-section of countries, but they also reveal that corruption may 
have a positive concave effect on economic variables for the OECD sample. Nonlinear least 
squares estimates of the elasticities of physical and human capital, with the inclusion of the cor-
ruption index, confirm that the productivity of inputs is impacted.    
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
uring the past decade, corruption and its impact on the economy have received a great deal of atten-
tion. The resurgence of this topic is a consequence of a couple of factors. First, there is an increase in 
the number of corruption indexes. Researchers can now empirically examine the effects of corruption 
on output and other factors. Second, and more importantly, corruption has become more prevalent in the global 
economy (Tanzi, 1998).  
 
With few exceptions [(Leff, 1964) and Huntington, (1968)], the effects of corruption on the economy have 
been shown to be negative [(Mauro, 1995 and 1996), Leite and Weidmann, 1999), (Tanzi, 1998) and  (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 1997)]. For the most part, these authors have focused on the linear relationship between corruption and 
economic growth. In these models, bribery is taken in the same context as taxation with little emphasis placed on its 
impact on factors of production. Therefore, the effects of corruption on the production function have not been fully 
investigated.  
 
It is with this objective in mind that this author departs from the conventional view of corruption. This pa-
per argues that the effect of corruption goes beyond the pricing system. In this framework, corruption is treated as an 
exogenous factor that deteriorates the productivity of inputs of a representative firm’s production function. The dete-
rioration may take various forms, ranging from the effects of externalities or diminished quality of inputs. The firm 
who pays a bribe to a bureaucrat to avoid fines not only reduces its level of investment, but it may also impose ex-
ternalities onto other firms. When a high government official makes an attempt to provide public goods by doing 
business with his unqualified cronies, this comes at the cost of reduced productivity in the private sector (Vito and 
Tanzi, 1997.  
 
2.  The Model 
 
The model begins with an economy that produces only one good. Output is produced with a well-behaved 
neoclassical production function with positive and strictly diminishing marginal products of human and physical  
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the author via email.
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capital.  The Inada conditions assure that the marginal products of both capital and labor approach infinity as their 
values approach zero and approach zero as their values go to infinity. The functional form of the production function 
is Cobb-Douglas
1
  
 
 Yt = Kt

Ht

[At()Lt]
1--
; (1) 
 
where Yt  is the aggregate level of real income, Kt 
 
is the level of physical capital, Ht
 
is the level of human capital, Lt
 
is the amount of labor employed, At is the level of multifactor productivity and  is the level of corruption in a coun-
try; where A’() <0. 
 
Let 0 <  < 1, 0 <  < 1 and  +  < 1. These ensure that the production function exhibits constant returns 
to scale and diminishing return to each input. The state equations are: 
 
 
dt
dK
= sKYt - KKt (2) 
 
dt
dH
= sHYt - HHt; (3) 
 
where sH, sK , H and K are exogenous parameters that represent, respectively, shares of income that are allocated to 
human capital investment, physical investment, and depreciation rates of human and physical capital. Population is 
exogenously determined and defined as Lt = Loe
nt
 so that population growth is constant over time, (dL/dt)/Lt= n.
2
 
 
Let At describe the economy’s multifactor productivity; 
 
 At() = Ãte
-
, where 0     1 and (4) 
 Ãt = Aoe
gt
. (5) 
 
The corruption parameters,  and , together determine the magnitude of the effect of corruption on multi-
factor productivity. The parameter, , is a measure of the economy’s overall level of corruption while  captures the 
sensitivity of corruption to the production function. Conventional multifactor productivity, Ãt, is exogenous and 
grows at rate g. We assume that dAt /d < 0 and d
2
At /d
2
 > 0.   If there is no corruption ( = 0), then Ãt = At and eq-
uation (6) reverts to the traditional Solow growth model (MRW, 1992). The sign and value of  are instrumental in 
modeling the net effect of corruption on multifactor productivity. Since  is a nonnegative real number bounded by 
0 and 1, a positive (negative) value of  causes corruption to reduce (improve) multifactor productivity.  
 
2.1.  Steady State Level Equation 
 
The steady state levels of physical and human capital per effective worker and output per effective worker 
are as follows: 
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*
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where k
*
t = Kt/(ÃtLt), h
*
t = Ht/(ÃtLt) and y
*
t = Yt/(ÃtLt). 
 
It is further assumed that physical and human capital depreciate at the same rate so that H = K=. From 
these equations, logarithmic steady state expressions for real output and physical investment per worker are as fol-
lows: 
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where 
K
L
o
o
 is the initial level of physical capital per worker . 
 
With the exception of the corruption term, the equations for steady state output per worker and physical in-
vestment per worker are consistent with the standard neoclassical growth model. Conditional convergence in physi-
cal capital, the hallmark of the neoclassical growth model, is also expressed in equation (14). The effect of corrup-
tion on the two endogenous variables remains ambiguous, as it depends on the sign of . However, a priori, corrup-
tion has a negative impact on capital accumulation and thus implies that  is a positive-valued parameter. Hence, 
higher levels of corruption will reduce average investment per worker.
3
  
 
2.2.  Convergence To Steady State 
 
An expression for the speed of convergence at steady state is expressed as the first order linear differential 
equation: 
 
 dln yt/dt = (ln y
ss
 – ln yt) (12) 
 
where  is a parameter for the speed of convergence.  A solution to equation (12) is written as: 
 
 ln yt - ln y0 = ( 1 - e
-t
)[ ln (Ao) + gt -  
 
 

 1
ln ( n++g ) 
     + 

 1 
ln (sK) + 

 1 
 ln (sH)  (13) 
–  – ln y0]. 
 
Since the speed of convergence, , is a constant, equation (13) states that economic growth is a function of 
the initial level of multifactor productivity and its growth rate, population growth rate, physical and human capital 
investment rates, the level of corruption and initial level of output. Again, conditional convergence is captured with 
the negative relationship between initial level of output and the level of economic growth.   
 
A priori, the sign of  is assumed positive. Therefore, it can easily be shown from equation (13) that corrup-
tion reduces economic growth by acting as an opposing force to efficiencies obtained through improvements in mul-
tifactor productivity. Corruption reduces the effectiveness of physical and human capital, which consequently results 
in lower levels of output per worker and subsequently lower levels of output, since investment rates (sk and sH) are 
fixed.  
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3.  The Corruption Data 
 
The corruption data are extracted from the IRIS Time Series of the International Country Risk Guide 
(1997), developed by the IRIS Center (University of Maryland)
 4
. As the author has alluded to in the introduction, 
there have been a number of indices of corruption that have become available to researchers in recent years (Trans-
parency International, 2001). To a great extent, these measures are highly correlated and share some similar charac-
teristics that contribute to their overall validity. For all of the data sets, the data points are highly persistent over time 
for OECD countries. This fact is not completely true for non-OECD countries. For these samples, there are measur-
able changes in corruption over time for a variety of countries. However, there are reasons why the author selects the 
ICRG data set to proxy corruption.  
 
First, various authors have used the data set (Mauro (1995,1997), Vito and Tanzi (1997) and Keefer and 
Knack (1995), to name a few). Second, to avoid measurement errors that may arise from using only a few years or 
less as data points for corruption, the ICRG data set contains data for 13 consecutive years from 1982-1995. Moreo-
ver, this series best coincides with the national accounts data that ends in 1992.  
 
The corruption index is an estimator of the degree of political corruption in a political system. It is a subjec-
tive measure of corruption for over 128 countries that ranges from 0 to 6, with 6 being the least corrupt. Each year’s 
estimate is an average of perceived corruption for two months of that year. As measured, it is a measure of the de-
gree of corruption in the form of “…special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, ex-
change controls, tax assessments, police protection or loans.” The estimate also takes into account “ …excess patro-
nage, nepotism, job reservations, favor-for-favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics 
and business” (ICRG, pg. 6). In their assessment, ICRG looks first at how long a government has been in continuous 
power. This data is then rectified to account for other political variables such as rule of law, accountability, etc.  
 
 Recall that the index of corruption bureaucratic agents in equation (1) is expressed as ρ. As its proxy, the 
function 
 
 CORRUPT(t ) =  (1 - t/6) (14) 
 
is used for two reasons.  First, for ease of interpretation, CORRUPT() transforms  the  raw corruption index so that 
higher values of CORRUPT correspond to higher levels of corruption.  Second, since t is bounded by 0 and 6, 
therefore, CORRUPT() is bounded by 0 and 1. Rescaling makes CORRUPT more consistent with ρ, the percentage 
of corrupt agents. To capture any nonlinear effects of corruption, the corruption function will enter the production 
function both linearly and non-linearly. Therefore,  will take on two specific forms: 
 
 CORRPUPT = (1 - t/6), and  (15) 
 CORRUPTSQ = (1 - t/6)
2
. (16) 
 
4.  The Results 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the model of real GDP level in 1989 with and without corruption as an expla-
natory variable. The results of the base-line model (equations 1B, 1B and 1C) are consistent with that of MRW 
(1992). In an effort to estimate the elasticities of output with respect to physical and human capital ( and ), the re-
stricted OLS models are also estimated. Their estimates are .31 and .23, for physical and human capital elasticities, 
respectively and are highly statistically significant. The author attributes any differences in the base–line results in 
Table 3 from that of MRW to three factors: differences in the time period (1960-1989), sample size and sample se-
lection.
5
 
 
The estimation of the model of real steady state GDP (equation (9)), is provided by specifications 2A, 2B, 
and 2C. With the exception of the log of investment, all of the coefficients of the variables enter the model statisti-
cally significant in the NON-Oil sample. The inclusion of the corruption variable increases the explanatory power of 
the specifications. There is an increase from 76% to 83% in explanatory power in the Non-Oil sample and from 61% 
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to 71% in the Non-OECD sample, as the standard error of the estimate falls from .51 to .43 and .55 to .48 for the two 
samples, respectively. In each specification, the coefficient of the corruption variable is negative and statistically 
significant. There is observed interaction between the investment and corruption variables. With the inclusion of the 
corruption variable in the regression, the level of the investment coefficient is greatly reduced and is no longer statis-
tically significant. These phenomena give rise to the notion that the base-line equation, as that of MRW (1992) is 
mis-specified and suffers from a missing variable bias. Additionally, the level of the coefficient of the corruption va-
riable is fairly stable over sample size, ranging from only -1.32 in the NON-OIL sample to -1.33 for the OECD sam-
ple. When output elasticity of corruption is taken at the mean, this implies that if corruption in Algeria were to im-
prove to that of Italy, the standard of living of the average Algerian would improve to approximately that of the av-
erage Argentinean. Moreover, independent of the initial level of output per person and holding both forms of capital 
and population growth constant, an increase in corruption reduces the steady-state level of output per worker.  
 
As a formal test of parabolic convexity, a Theil (1971) t-statistic is calculated for the corruption variable in 
each of the specifications listed above. Their values indicate that convexity is not a concern in Non-Oil and Non-
OED samples. However, the same conclusion cannot be reached in the OECD sample. The Theil (1971) t-statistic 
detects a strong possibility of convexity in the BLUS
6
 residuals when the data is sorted by the corruption variable. 
This is a convincing argument for the inclusion of a squared corruption term (CORRUPTSQ) in the regression equa-
tion (specification 2D). In the presence of high multicollinearity of CORRUPT and CORRUPTSQ, the coefficients 
of the CORRUPTSQ variable remain statistically significant in the OECD sample.
7
 The Adj. R-Square of the OECD 
sample is increased from 29% to 50% with the inclusion of the corruption variable and to 62% with the corruption 
variable and its squared term. Similarly, the standard error of the estimates falls from .24 to .21 in specification 2D, 
providing more evidence to its superiority. The coefficient of the CORRUPTSQ coefficient is –6.33, suggesting a 
strong negative nonlinear relationship between corruption and output per worker for the OECD countries. Moreover, 
a continued increase in corruption of an OECD country decreases its standard of living, but at a decreasing rate. The 
output elasticity of corruption calculated at the mean value of corruption for an OECD country is .82.  
 
Table 4 contains base growth models as an explanatory. Conditional convergence is a major finding as 
represented by a negative and statistically significant coefficient of ln(GDP60). An increase in the physical capital 
and human capital saving rates has a positive effect on convergence to steady state output. This is represented by 
positive and statistically significant coefficients of the investment and schooling variables. Moreover, the estimates 
of ,  and  are statistically significant at the 1% level for the NON-Oil sample, but not for the non-OECD sample. 
The convergence rate of .015 for the non-OIL sample implies that a representative economy would take 46.2 years 
to be halfway from arrival to its steady-state output value. The OECD model explains 85% of the variation in 
growth rates of OECD member countries.   
 
Specification 2A, 2B and 2C are the results of estimating equation (13). The signs and level of the coeffi-
cients for the non-OIL and non-OECD samples support the neoclassical model of economic growth. The coefficients 
of the corruption variable are statistically significantly, with observed interaction between the corruption variable 
and the other right-hand side variables. Corruption increases the magnitude and significance of the coefficient 
schooling and also reduces the level of the coefficient of the investment variable.  Again, as in the level equation 
(specification 2B of Table 3) there is evidence of misspecification in the MRW (1992) growth. This fact is further 
corroborated with a reduction in the output elasticity of physical capital from .35 to .18 and an increase the output 
elasticity of human capital from .27 to .34, while these estimates remain highly statistically significant. Conditional 
convergence is preserved in the presence of the corruption variable in the model. 
 
The Theil (1971) t-statistics reveals no caution for parabolic convexity in the economic growth model for 
the NON-OIL and NON-OECD specifications. Once again, however, the same is not true for the OECD sample. A 
t-statistic of –2.40 provides strong evidence of parabolic convexity in the corruption variable. Even more interesting 
is the surprising sign reversal of the corruption coefficient.  This finding suggests that an initial increase in corrup-
tion has a positive effect on a developed country’s convergence to its steady state output. When the square corrup-
tion term enters the model, the sign of its coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This unexpected finding 
suggests that initial increases in corruption enhance convergence to steady state output, albeit, at a decreasing rate. 
Furthermore, concavity of the corruption function suggests an “optimal” corruption.. The results for the OECD sam-
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ple are striking and to run counter to what has been previously described. Rose-Ackerman (1999) offers one possible 
explanation for this phenomenon. She maintains that the optimal corruption level in any economy is not zero. She 
posits that detection and prevention of corruption utilizes scarce resources that would otherwise be used to produce 
goods and services. Rose-Ackerman firmly writes, “The optimal amount of corruption is not zero even if one gives 
no value to the benefits received by bribers. Once one takes the costs of prevention into account, the level of deter-
rence expenditures should be set where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs” (Rose-Ackerman, pg 52). 
 
OECD economic growth is plotted against each country’s corruption index, in Appendix 1.  This data 
coupled with the regression results above suggest that a preponderance of OECD countries behave sub-optimally.  If 
firms had the ability of detecting and controlling the level of corruption that they face, they would. It stands to rea-
son that corruption must be exogenous to a firm’s production function, but politicians and government bureaucrats 
endogenously determine its level. 
 
 
Table 1 
Data Description 
 
Variable name Source Description 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) –  
Compiled by Political 
Risk Services – 
Average corruption from 1982-1989 for each country. Corruption 
Survey data ranging from “0” to “6”. A score of “0” relates to a coun-
try with relatively the most corruption. A ranking of “6” relates to a 
country that is least corrupt.  
CORRUPT 
Derived using raw  
corruption variable, . 
CORRUPT = (1 - /6). Converts raw corruption data to an index rang-
ing from “0” to “1”. The higher the index, the higher the average cor-
ruption. 
CORRUPTSQ 
Derived using raw  
corruption variable, . 
CORRUPTSQ=CORRUPT*CORRUPT 
GDP60 
Penn World Table  
(Mark 5.6a) 
Real GDP per worker (1985 International Prices) in year 1960.  
GDP89 
Penn World Table  
(Mark 5.6a), 1995 
Real GDP per worker (1985 International Prices) in year 1969. 
INV/GDP 
Penn World Table  
(Mark 5.6a) 
Average (1960-1989) real investment share of GDP (%) [1985  
international prices] 
POPGR 
Penn World Table  
(Mark 5.6a) 
Average population growth from years 1960-1989 
SCHOOL 
MRW, “A contribution to 
the empirics of Economic 
Growth”, QJE, 1992.  
Percentage of the working age population of ages 15-21 with a  
secondary education. (Average from 1960-1985). 
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Table 2A 
Simple Correlation (of means) Matrix –83 countries 
 
 PO
P
G
R
 
IN
V
/G
D
P
 
G
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P
6
0
 
G
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8
9
 
S
C
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O
O
L
 
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
 
C
O
R
R
U
P
T
S
Q
 
POPGR 
1.00       
INV/GDP -.61 1.00      
GDP60 -.59 .57 1.00     
GDP89 -.76 .77 .88 1.00    
SCHOOL -.60 .70 .62 .70 1.00   
CORRUPT .59 -.67 -.66 .78 -.47 1.00  
CORRUPTSQ .48 -.60 -.55 .66 -.39 .95 1.00 
Source: Corruption data extracted from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – Complied by Political Risk Services.  
National accounts data taken from Penn World Table (Mark 5.6a), 1995. 
 
 
Table 2B 
Quantitative Data Description – Means, Standard Deviations, etc. 
 
 NON-OIL SAMPLE 
(83 OBS) 
NON-OECD SAMPLE 
(61 OBS) 
OECD SAMPLE 
(22 OBS) 
 
Mean Min Max S.D. Mean Min Max S.D Mean Min Max S.D 
POPGR .02 .003 .04 .01 .02 .01 .04 .01 .01 .003 .02 .01 
INV/GDP 17.53 1.48 34.84 8.095 14.47 1.48 30.78 6.93 26.02 18.12 34.84 4.01 
GDP60 6849 579 24906 6074 4431 579 20445 3795 13554 3194 24906 6230 
GDP89 12805 1043 36859 10464 7854 1043 25628 6340 26532 7867 36859 6643 
SCHOOL 6.26 .50 11.90 3.379 5.25 .50 11.71 3.18 9.09 4.80 11.90 2.08 
CORUPT .43 .00 1.00 .28 .54 .00 1.00 .23 .13 .00 .52 .15 
Source: Corruption data extracted from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – Complied by Political Risk Services.  
National accounts data taken from Penn World Table (Mark 5.6a), 1995. 
 
Journal Of Business And Economics Research Volume 1, Number 1 
 100 
 
Figure 1 
Economic Growth 
OECD Countries 
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Source: Corruption data extracted from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) – Complied by Political Risk Services.  
Economic growth taken from Penn World Table (Mark 5.6a), 1995. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Economic Growth 
Full Countries 
 
Full Sample Economic Growth
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Source: Corruption data extracted from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) – Complied by Political Risk Services.  
Economic growth taken from Penn World Table (Mark 5.6a), 1995. 
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Table 3 
Regression of GDP level – Eq. (9) 
Dependent Variable: Log of GDP per working-age person in 1989 
SAMPLE  
 
         N 
EQUATION # 
NON- 
OIL 
83 
(1A) 
NON- 
OIL 
83 
(2A)
D 
NON- 
OECD 
61 
(1B) 
NON- 
OECD 
61 
(2B)
 D
 
OECD 
 
22 
(1C) 
OECD 
 
22 
(2C)
 D
 
OECD 
 
22 
(2D) 
CONSTANT .83 
(.85) 
5.17 
(4.09) 
4.4 
(2.34) 
6.54 
(3.04) 
2.89 
(.59) 
6.83  
(2.40) 
10.91 
(3.71) 
Ln (INV/GDP) .42 
(3.54) 
.16 
(1.53) 
.34 
(2.62) 
.11 
(1.01) 
.38 
(.99) 
.26 
(.84) 
.07 
(.23) 
Ln (SCHOOL) .60 
(6.55) 
.69 
(8.64) 
.64 
(7.14) 
.73 
(8.82) 
.58 
(1.67) 
.17 
(.85) 
-.10 
(-.68) 
CORRUPT 
 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-1.32 
(-4.89) 
T
(.12) 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-1.33 
(-4.68) 
T
(-.16) 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-1.33 
(-3.10) 
T
(-2.30) 
.87 
(1.47) 
--- 
CORRUPTSQ
 
 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-6.33 
(-3.47) 
Ln (.05 + POPGR) -2.29 
(-5.77) 
-1.08 
(-2.54) 
-.1.58 
(-1.06) 
-.57 
(-.74) 
-1.815 
(-1.75) 
-.80 
(-1.04) 
.23 
(.32) 
Adj. R
2 
.76 .83 .61 .71 .29 .50 .62 
S.E.E. .51 .43 .55 .48 .28 .24 .21 
Restricted  
Regression: 
       
CONSTANT 3.43 
(6.98) 
5.72 
(10.65) 
4.32 
(7.80) 
5.88 
(10.67) 
3.98 
(1.31) 
7.39 
(3.04) 
--- 
--- 
{ln(INV/gdp) - 
ln(.05 +POPGR)} 
.497 
(3.89) 
.16 
(1.54) 
.342 
(2.63) 
.12 
(1.05) 
.505 
(1.14) 
.33 
(.94) 
--- 
--- 
{ln(SCHOOL) – 
ln(.05 + POPGR)} 
.684 
(7.56) 
.70 
(9.23) 
.638 
(7.07) 
.72 
(9.31) 
.612 
(1.72) 
.18 
(.89) 
--- 
--- 
CORRUPT 
 
--- 
--- 
-1.36 
(-5.59) 
--- 
--- 
-1.32 
(-4.71) 
--- 
--- 
-1.36 
(-3.14) 
--- 
--- 
Adj. R
2
 .75 .83 .62 .71 .31 .52 --- 
S.E.E. .52 .43 .55 .48 .28 .23 --- 
Test of  
Restrictions: 
       
Implied  .23 
(4.7) 
.09 
(1.58) 
.17 
(2.78) 
.06 
(.93) 
.24 
(1.70) 
.22 
(1.31) 
--- 
--- 
Implied  .31 
(7.1) 
.38 
(8.51) 
.32 
(6.11) 
.39 
(7.39) 
.29 
(2.75) 
.12 
(.83) 
--- 
--- 
Implied  --- 
--- 
1.36 
(6.27) 
--- 
--- 
1.32 
(4.40) 
--- 
--- 
1.37 
(3.10) 
--- 
--- 
  
All variables are fully described in Chapter 4.  
Estimated heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
TDenotes the Theil (1971) t-statistics – test for parabolic convexity. 
Ddirect test of equation (9). 
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Table 4 
Regression of GDP Growth  - Eq. (13) 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Difference Of GDP Per Working-Age Person From 1960-1989 
SAMPLE  
        N 
EQUATION # 
NON- 
OIL 
83 
(1A) 
NON- 
OIL 
83 
(2A) D 
NON- 
OECD 
61 
(1B) 
NON- 
OECD 
61 
(2B) D 
OECD 
 
22 
(1C) 
OECD 
 
22 
(2C) D 
OECD 
 
22 
(2D) 
CONSTANT .11 
(.155) 
2.65 
(2.06) 
2.00 
(1.11) 
3.77 
(1.94) 
.65 
(.62) 
-1.97 
(-1.90) 
.96 
(.66) 
ln(INV/GDP) .31 
(3.49) 
.19 
(1.97) 
.260 
(2.61) 
.12 
(1.18) 
.51 
(4.21) 
.61 
(4.91) 
.48 
(4.23) 
ln(SCHOOL) .24 
(2.57) 
.36 
(4.13) 
.27 
(2.87) 
.38 
(4.17) 
.14 
(1.81) 
.24 
(2.87) 
.10 
(1.20) 
CORRUPT 
 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-.73 
(-2.59) 
T(-1.10) 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-.87 
(-2.96) 
T(.28) 
--- 
--- 
--- 
.71 
(3.74) 
T(-2.40) 
1.64 
(4.58) 
--- 
CORRUPTSQ 
 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-3.24 
(-3.23) 
Ln(.05 + POPGR) -.90 
(-3.00) 
-.49 
(-1.29) 
-.12 
(-.16) 
-.01 
(-.02) 
-1.09 
(-3.88) 
-1.37 
(-5.80) 
-.79 
(-2.75) 
ln(GDP60) -.37 
(-4.95) 
-.49 
(-6.62) 
-.35 
(-3.87) 
-.45 
(-5.23) 
-.53 
(-15.00) 
-.40 
(-7.50) 
-.46 
(-8.16) 
Adj. R2 .33 .41 .23 .35 .85 .88 .91 
S.E.E. .37 .35 .42 .39 .12 .11 .09 
Restricted Regression:        
CONSTANT .74 
(1.94) 
2.53 
(3.53) 
1.04 
(2.00) 
2.60 
(3.56) 
1.21 
(1.06) 
-1.10 
(-.81) 
--- 
--- 
ln(INV/gdp)- ln(.05 
+POPGR) 
.33 
(3.77) 
.19 
(1.94) 
.26 
(2.67) 
.13 
(1.23) 
.60 
(3.90) 
.71 
(4.53) 
--- 
--- 
ln(SCHOOL) - ln(.05 
+POPGR) 
.25 
(2.66) 
.353 
(4.22) 
.25 
(2.48) 
.36 
(3.99) 
.157 
(2.00) 
.25 
(2.98) 
--- 
--- 
CORRUPT  
 
--- 
--- 
-.73 
(-2.84) 
--- 
--- 
-.86 
(-2.94) 
--- 
--- 
.65 
(3.15) 
--- 
--- 
ln(GDP60) -.36 
(-4.70) 
-.49 
(-6.52) 
-.35 
(-4.05) 
-.46 
(-5.31) 
-.52 
(-15.10) 
-.41 
(-7.93) 
--- 
--- 
Adj. R2 .33 .42 .24 .35 .85 .87 --- 
S.E.E. .37 .35 .42 .39 .12 .11 --- 
Test of Restrictions:        
Implied  .35 
(4.17) 
.18 
(2.21) 
.30 
(2.67) 
.13 
(1.27) 
.47 
(5.00) 
.52 
(6.15) 
--- 
--- 
Implied  .27 
(3.63) 
.34 
(5.27) 
.29 
(3.07) 
.38 
(4.62) 
.12 
(1.49) 
.18 
(2.43) 
--- 
--- 
Implied  .015 
(3.86) 
.023 
(4.41) 
.015 
(2.78) 
.021 
(3.78) 
.026 
(6.67) 
.018 
(3.97) 
--- 
--- 
Implied  --- 
--- 
1.48 
(4.11) 
--- 
--- 
1.89 
(3.27) 
--- 
--- 
-1.598 
(-1.47) 
--- 
--- 
All variables are fully described in Chapter 4. 
Estimated heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
TDenotes the Theil (1971) t-statistics – test for parabolic convexity  
Ddirect test of equation (13). 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
Corruption has recently found its way back in the mainstream of the economics literature. Most recent con-
tributions to the body of literature have focused on its distortionary effects on a market economy. To a large extent, 
most of these works have provided support of a negative effect of corruption on investment and economic growth. 
As an attempt to look beyond the pricing system, this paper has presented a theoretical model showing corruption 
negating investment, standard of living and economic growth. 
 
The empirical findings suggest that increased levels of corruption reduce a country’s standard of living. 
Since this finding is linear, an increase in the amount of corruption has a proportional decrease in a country’s level 
of investment – regardless of the size of the country. The results for standard of living are not so uniform. Increases 
in the level of corruption retards standard of living proportionally for developing countries, but it does so in a de-
creasing, convex way for the OECD. An analysis of the effects of corruption on economic growth produces similar 
results. Corruption has a negative linear effect on developing countries. However, the results are rather surprising for 
OECD countries. A reduction in corruption has a positive concave effect on economic growth. OECD countries can 
improve their economic growth by becoming more corrupt. Hence, there is a n “optimal” level of corruption for 
OECD. One potential explanation for these results is that the eradication of corruption carries an opportunity cost. 
Ceteris paribus, as a developing country deploys its resources from productive activities to the detection and preven-
tion of corrupt ones, there are positive, but diminishing returns.   
 
These findings have a strong effect on policy formulation. A prescription for the ills of one country should 
not be used for the cure of another. In that notion, the author proposes a few recommendations for policy makers. 1) 
Since political corruption is endogenously determined in a country’s polity, the reduction of corruption should be 
balanced with other national agenda items. 2) Give proper accounting rigor to activities or systems in place to fight-
ing of corruption.   
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Appendix 
 
Cross-Country Data 
 
COUNTRY              POPGR    I/GDP  CORRUPT    GDP60     GDP89   SCHOOL 
BANGLADESH           0.025   4.28      0.00     2768     4758      3.2 
ZAIRE                0.029   4.09      0.19     1024     1118      3.6 
HAITI                0.017   5.16      0.56     1673     1990      1.9 
INDONESIA            0.022   16.15     0.56     1638     4677      4.1 
PARAGUAY             0.029   13.16     0.94     3575     6045      4.4 
GUYANA               0.014   24.14     1.00     5608     3055     11.7 
MALI                 0.024   6.05      1.08     1506     1243      1.0 
PHILIPPINES          0.027   15.21     1.13     2971     4718     10.6 
BOLIVIA              0.025   16.90     1.25     3322     5336      4.9 
PAKISTAN             0.030   10.65     1.63     2027     4663      3.0 
EGYPT                0.024   4.61      1.69     2796     6888      7.0 
SUDAN                0.029   13.51     1.69     2420     2491      2.0 
SYRIA                0.033   14.94     1.69     5690     15141     8.8 
ZAMBIA               0.032   22.23     1.69     2662     2260      2.4 
UGANDA               0.031   2.45      1.75     1206     2079      1.1 
GHANA                0.026   6.19      1.94     2044     1799      4.7 
EL SALVADOR          0.024   8.36      2.00     4371     5489      3.9 
GUATEMALA            0.029   9.14      2.00     5292     7483      2.4 
HONDURAS             0.033   13.86     2.00     3268     4671      3.7 
JAMAICA              0.013   21.95     2.00     4338     5178     11.2 
SIERRA               0.020   1.48      2.00     2035     2521      1.7 
TOGO                 0.029   15.96     2.00      792     1562      2.9 
CAMEROON             0.026   8.54      2.19     1348     2890      3.4 
PANAMA               0.025   20.42     2.19     4739     7771     11.6 
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO      0.016   12.46     2.25     16901    20130     8.8 
KOREA                0.019   22.75     2.38     2703     14697    10.2 
TANZANIA             0.030   10.72     2.56      579     1126      0.5 
PERU                 0.026   17.72     2.69     6309     7050      8.0 
VENEZUELA            0.033   18.08     2.69     20445    17083     7.0 
MEXICO               0.026   16.56     2.75     9517     16373     6.6 
KENYA                0.037   15.66     2.81     1451     1944      2.4 
TURKEY               0.024   21.12     2.88     3194     7867      5.5 
INDIA                0.023   13.70     2.94     1761     3167      5.1 
TUNISIA              0.022   14.78     2.94     3931     8508      4.3 
COLOMBIA             0.024   15.87     3.00     5485     10104     6.1 
CONGO                0.029   10.45     3.00     2494     4912      3.8 
CYPRUS               0.007   27.39     3.00     4967     16999     8.2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC   0.026   15.07     3.00     4130     7819      5.8 
GAMBIA               0.029   4.85      3.00     1142     1739      1.5 
JORDAN               0.023   14.03     3.00     4488     12998    10.8 
PAPUA                0.023   15.50     3.00     2270     3290      1.5 
SENEGAL              0.025   5.16      3.00     2164     2431      1.7 
SRILANKA             0.018   9.04      3.00     3508     5578      8.3 
URUGUAY              0.007   12.90     3.00     9784     12022     7.0 
ECUADOR              0.028   22.25     3.19     4459     9154      7.2 
THAILAND             0.026   17.07     3.19     1884     6157      4.4 
 
Journal Of Business And Economics Research Volume 1, Number 1 
 105 
Cross-Country Data (Cont’d) 
 
COUNTRY              POPGR   I/GDP   CORRUPT    GDP60      GDP89   SCHOOL 
CHILE                0.018   19.41     3.31     8756     11986     7.7 
ALGERIA              0.028   21.49     3.43     6517     12530     4.5 
ARGENTINA            0.015   16.66     3.69     11339    13938     5.0 
ITALY                0.005   28.10     3.81     11063    30321     7.1 
BRAZIL               0.025   19.46     3.88     5549     11668     4.7 
GREECE               0.006   24.93     3.88     5151     17625     7.9 
BOTSWANA             0.033   18.93     3.92     1224     7123      2.9 
MOZAMBIQUE           0.025   1.85      4.00     1905     1593      0.7 
NIGER                0.029   8.65      4.00      902     1043      0.5 
PORTUGAL             0.004   22.92     4.00     4853     14642     5.8 
MALAWI               0.030   9.94      4.21      765     1223      0.6 
NICARAGUA            0.029   11.54     4.25     5124     4278      5.8 
SPAIN                0.008   25.19     4.50     8186     25518     8.0 
MALAYSIA             0.026   22.68     4.75     4110     11498     7.3 
COSTARICA            0.030   16.07     5.00     6830     9905      7.0 
ISRAEL               0.027   26.30     5.00     9685     23063     9.5 
JAPAN                0.009   34.06     5.00     4998     21691    10.9 
AUSTRALIA            0.017   28.76     5.19     19261    31271     9.8 
GERMANY              0.004   27.99     5.19     13919    28505     8.4 
HONG KONG            0.022   19.96     5.19     4172     21962     7.2 
IRELAND              0.007   24.75     5.19     8391     22186    11.4 
AUSTRIA              0.003   25.70     5.25     10713    26004     8.0 
FRANCE               0.007   27.24     5.25     13478    29879     8.9 
U.S.A.               0.011   21.49     5.31     24433    36859    11.9 
BELGIUM              0.003   23.75     5.63     14310    30765     9.3 
SINGAPORE            0.017   30.78     5.63     5008     23030     9.0 
SOUTH AFRICA         0.025   18.57     5.64     6306     9891      3.0 
U.K.                 0.003   18.12     5.81     14754    26858     8.9 
CANADA               0.011   24.15     6.00     24906    35069    10.6 
DENMARK              0.004   25.93     6.00     14807    24647    10.7 
FINLAND              0.009   34.84     6.00     11577    27740    11.5 
ICELAND              0.012   28.80     6.00     12585    25268    10.2 
NETHERLANDS          0.009   24.74     6.00     17117    30384    10.7 
NEW ZEALAND          0.012   24.57     6.00     21285    26121    11.9 
NORWAY               0.006   31.37     6.00     14291    28913    10.0 
SWEDEN               0.004   23.49     6.00     17352    28370     7.9 
SWITZERLAND          0.007   29.19     6.00     20149    32480     4.8 
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Endnotes 
 
1. The Cobb-Douglas function provides a reasonable description of actual economies (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 1995).  For the effects of corruption on a production function with no structural form, see  
Appendix A. 
2. Since full employment is assumed, the labor force is equal to the employed. This also implies that the labor 
force growth rate is also given by n. 
3. Doing the same for equation (10) yields a similar expression for the growth of human capital per worker at 
steady state. 
4. This variable has been used in various papers including Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Keefer and Knack 
(1995), Leite and Weidmann (1999) and others. 
5. This is most obvious when a comparison is made of the non-OECD and intermediate samples. The striking 
differences in sample size and selection yield very dissimilar results, with the MRW specification outper-
forming that of the author. 
6. Best Linear Unbiased Scalar. Refer to Stokes (1999). 
7. Even though the coefficient of CORRUPT is statistically insignificant, jointly CORRUPT and  
CORRUPTSQ better explain differences in real GDP per worker for the OECD sample. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 The Cobb-Douglas function provides a reasonable description of actual economies (Barro and 
Sala-I-Martin, 1995). For the effects of corruption on a production function with no structural 
form see Appendix A. 
2
 Since full employment is assumed, the labor force is equal to the employed. This also implies 
that the labor force growth rate is also given by n.  
3
 Doing the same for equation (10) yields a similar expression for the growth of human capital 
per worker at steady state.  
4
 This variable has been used in various papers including Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Keefer 
and Knack (1995), Leite and Weidmann (1999) and others. 
5
 This is most obvious when a comparison is made of the non-OECD and intermediate sam-
ples. The striking differences in sample size and selection yield very dissimilar results, with the 
MRW specification outperforming that of the author.  
6
 Best Linear Unbiased Scalar. Refer to Stokes (1999). 
 
7
 Even though the coefficient of CORRUPT is statistically insignificant, jointly CORRUPT and 
CORRUPTSQ better explain differences in real GDP per worker for the OECD sample.  
